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Protecting the Environment by Addressing Market
Failure in Intellectual Property Law:
Why Compulsory Licensing of Green Technologies
Might Make Sense in the United States: A Balancing
Approach
Environmental degradation is a growing concern for
governments throughout the world, but especially in the United
States. 1 According to most experts, global climate change presents
one of the most pressing environmental problems in the world
today. 2 Other significant environmental problems include degraded
air 3 and water quality, 4 collapsing fisheries, 5 overloaded landfills, 6
and accumulating waste in the world’s oceans. 7 Imagine that a
1. The international community has many organizations devoted to understanding
environmental degradation, but perhaps the best reports on international environmental issues
are produced within the United Nations. World Risk Report 2013: Focus: Environmental
Degradation and Disasters, available at http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/10487.pdf.
Domestically, all you have to do is pick up a newspaper to see the multitude of environmental
issues making headlines. See, e.g., Florida Sues BP Over Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/business/energy-environment/florida-suesbp-over-gulf-oil-spill.html?ref=earth&_r=0; Bettina Boxall, Bay Area Air Pollution Reaches
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2013),
Devils
Postpile
National
Monument,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-air-pollution-devils-postpile20130424,0,5734715.story; Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Many Coal Sludge
Impoundments Have Weak Walls, Federal Study Says, WASH. POST (April 24, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/many-coal-sludge-impound
ments-have-weak-walls-federal-study-says/2013/04/24/76c5be2a-acf9-11e2-a8b92a63d75b5459_story.html.
2. Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306:5702
SCIENCE 1686 (2004).
3. See, e.g., C. Arden Pope, III et al., Fine-particle Air Pollution and Life Expectancy in
the United States, 360(4) NEW ENG. J. MED. 376 (2009).
4. See, e.g., Robert I. McDonald et al., Global Urban Growth and the Geography of
Water Availability, Quality, and Delivery, 40(5) AMBIO 437 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Malin L. Pinsky et al., Unexpected Patterns of Fisheries Collapse in the
World’s Oceans, 108(20) PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 8317
(2011).
6. See, e.g., Christine Longo & Jeffrey Wagner, Bridging Legal and Economic
Perspective on Interstate Municipal Solid Waste Disposal in the U.S., 31 WASTE MANAGEMENT
147 (2011).
7. Jocelyn Kaiser, The Dirt on Ocean Garbage Patches, 328 SCIENCE 1506 (2010).
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solution to any one of these problems was within the grasp of
humanity, but was quickly hidden away by those interested in
perpetuating the status quo. This phenomenon has been well
documented 8 and is commonly referred to as patent suppression. 9
Patent suppression is the process by which an individual or a
company obtains a patent for an emerging technology in order to
prevent that technology from coming to market. 10 Under the current
United States patent law regime, it is possible for a company, fearing
competition from an emerging technology, to buy the patent for the
new technology in order to suppress it. 11 In this situation, the new
patent holder can refuse to use the new technology while
simultaneously refusing to license it to any other market participants,
eliminating any possibility that the technology be put to beneficial
use during the life of the patent. In a world that desperately needs to
address its environmental problems, this use of U.S. patent law
protection can delay the development of environmentally important
technologies. This paper will address one possible solution to this
problem: compulsory licensing.
Of course, any compulsory licensing regime must address
competing policy goals. On one hand, a compulsory licensing statute
can be a tool that the government uses to ensure beneficial
technologies are not suppressed and are made available to the
market. On the other hand, compulsory licensing laws risk eroding
the value of a patent to the point that the incentive to innovate is
destroyed. After all, the patent system exists as a mechanism for
rewarding those who create beneficial technologies. 12 There are
already a few narrowly applied statutes in the United States which

8. See infra Part I.B.2.
9. Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling Resource
Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI Q. 512 (1987); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation
Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487 (1998); Kurt M.
Saunders & Linda Levin, Better, Faster, Cheaper—Later: What Happens When Technologies are
Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 393 (2002).
11. SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d. Cir. 1981) (holding that as long as
a patent is acquired legally, it is not a violation of antitrust law to use the patent to the “full
extent allowed under patent law” which includes preventing third parties from using a
technology even when the patent holder itself is not using the patented technology).
12. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.).
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provide for compulsory licensing of some technologies. 13 This paper
will argue that a mandatory licensing statute which encompasses
more environmentally beneficial technologies can overcome the
problem of patent suppression while still maintaining the incentive to
innovate. Part I provides a background discussion of some important
environmental policy considerations, including the importance of
technological advances as a means of solving environmental
problems and the policy considerations surrounding patent law and
compulsory licensing. Part II discusses why a broader compulsory
licensing regime could be beneficial. Part III addresses some of the
primary concerns over such a policy and discusses how we might
potentially balance the conflicting policy goals. Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
Within the academic literature on environmental policy, there is
no paucity of work discussing a market-based approach to solving
environmental problems. Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons
and the long line of related commons analysis describe how many
environmental problems arise from market failure. 14 That line of
literature generally suggests the possibility of either privatization or
regulation of public resources as a means of addressing market
failure. 15 This section addresses another piece of the puzzle:
technological innovation. Similar to Hardin’s discussion of the
commons, technological innovation is another area wherein a
market-based approach may be helpfully applied to environmental
policy. This section discusses how technological advancement may
help to solve environmental problems. Then it discusses some of the
conflicting policy considerations in trying to ensure that there are
both adequate incentives for inventors to innovate while
simultaneously ensuring that new innovations are diffused into the
marketplace.

13. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
14. See Garret Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1242 (1968) (discussing the
problems inherent with public goods—where everybody has access but nobody has the right to
exclude).
15. Id. See also Michael Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Lea Kosnik, The Anticommons and the
Environment, 30:101 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 206–17 (2012) (discussing the opposite problem—
where nobody has access because too many people have the right to exclude).
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A. Technological Advancement as a Solution for Environmental
Problems
Technological advancement has the potential to solve many of
the world’s most dire environmental problems. While the Industrial
Revolution brought with it a slew of new environmental problems,
the development of environmentally friendly technologies that
followed led to significant environmental gains. 16 Catalytic
converters developed in the 1970s helped to reduce the aggregate
amount of harmful automobile emission despite an overall increase in
the number of vehicles on the road. 17 Recent advances in sulfur
scrubber technology have led to modern scrubbers capable reducing
sulfur emissions by up to ninety-five percent. 18 The threat of further
deforestation has been reduced by advances in recycling technology
as well as the advent of email, paperless document storage, and other
technological advances helping to reduce the public demand for
paper. 19
While these technological advances have helped to make
remarkable environmental gains in the last century, there remains
an enormous potential for further progress as new technologies are
developed. Advances in battery technology could make it possible
to completely displace the need for combustible engine-powered
automobiles. 20 Similarly, advances in large-scale energy production
technologies, like solar power plants, may help drastically reduce
the need to burn fossil fuels to generate electricity. Beyond these,
there are almost certainly technological possibilities which have not
yet been contemplated that could mitigate environmental problems
and make further environmental gains.

16. Dominique Foray & Arnulf Grübler, Technology and the Environment: An
Overview. 53(1) TECHNOLOGICAL FORCASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1996).
17. David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-forcing Policies: The 1970
Clean Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls in
the United States, 72(7) TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 761, 761–62
(2005).
18. Sulfur Dioxide Scrubbers, DUKE-ENERGY.COM, http://www.duke-energy.co
m/environment/air-quality/sulfur-dioxide-scrubbers.asp (last visited April 25, 2013).
19. EPA, Going Paperless with Technology, WASTEWISE UPDATE, http://www.e
pa.gov/osw/conserve/smm/wastewise/pubs/wwupda5.pdf (last visited April 25, 2013).
20. See, e.g., Steve Levin, The Great Battery Race, 182 FOREIGN POL’Y 88–95 (2010);
John Baker, New Technology and Possible Advances in Energy Storage, 36 ENERGY STORAGE
4368, 4368–73 (2008).
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B. Encouraging Innovation

While some of these technologies could have perhaps been
invented without governmental involvement, governments have
demonstrated an interest in creating a legal system that encourages
innovation. 21 There are several strategies that governments can use
to encourage innovation, but patent law has some advantages that
the other strategies do not. One strategy is through a policy often
referred to as technology forcing, whereby the government creates a
requirement that can only be met by advancement in technology,
thereby “forcing” the industry to either innovate or cease
operation. 22 The problem with this approach is that it is only
effective as a means of encouraging development of technologies
within the foresight of Congress or relevant regulatory agencies. 23
Another strategy is direct funding of important technologies. 24
This is a good way for the government to ensure that funding is
21. See, e.g., SUNIL MANI, GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2002).
22. One of the best examples of technology forcing policies leading to the development
of environmentally friendly technologies comes in the development of the catalytic converter.
See David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-forcing Policies: The 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls in the
United States, 72(7) TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 761, 761–62
(2005). In 1970, Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Air Act that required drastic
automobile emission reductions by 1975. Id. In 1970, the technology necessary to meet these
rigorous standards had not yet been developed. Id. The auto industry was forced to either
develop the necessary technology or be denied the right to sell their cars in the United States.
Id. As a result, the automobile industry developed the catalytic converter which—together with
subsequent technology—has led to an aggregate decrease in greenhouse gas emissions even in
the face of a 34% increase in the number of vehicles on the road. Id.
23. Technological forcing basically leads to a game of chicken between the government
and the innovator. It has been reported that in 1970, Congress had reason to believe that the
new pollution standards were within the realm of technological possibility. For the auto
industry, see JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: DETROIT’S BIG THREE AND THE POLITICS OF
POLLUTION (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows 2000). See also, JAMES E. KRIER AND
EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL
EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–75 (1977). There would have
been a problem, however, if Congress had guessed wrong. If the innovator is unable to
produce the necessary technology in time, the industry is harmed. When the regulated industry
constitutes a major part of the country’s economy, this may have far-reaching economic and
political impacts. For this reason, Congress is likely to be reluctant to require a significant
technological advancement for a major industry unless it reasonably expects the industry to be
able to comply. Thus, while this type of incentive for innovation can be effective, its
effectiveness is likely to be limited to those technologies that can reasonably be foreseen by
Congress.
24. MANI, supra note 21, at 107.
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directed towards technological innovation that is particularly
important. The problem, however, is similar to the problems
associated with technology forcing: it is only helpfully applied to
technologies within government foresight.
Patents, by comparison, allow the government to incentivize
an infinite number of possibilities. Because patents are available
for any invention so long as it is novel, useful, and not obvious, 25
patents serve as an incentive for an endless potential of beneficial
innovation. Patents provide a government-protected monopoly on
a new innovation. 26 By excluding others from use of the patented
technology, the inventor can profit from his or her invention
either by manufacturing and selling the invention himself, or by
licensing out the right to use the invention to others. 27
Although patent law has a longstanding tradition within the
United States, the extent to which patent law should protect patent
holders is sometimes unclear. A brief historical context of the patent
law system will demonstrate the social contract that exists between
society and an individual patent holder. By understanding this social
contract, it becomes apparent that compulsory licensing might make
sense as a way to ensure that the goals of the social contract are met.
1. Understanding patent law
American patent law has its roots in pre-revolutionary English
law. The English monarchy, at times, granted monopolies to certain
artisans, allowing them exclusive rights in their crafts. 28 These
monopolies allowed the privileged artisans to charge exorbitant
prices because nobody else could compete. This practice was seen by
many as corrupt, and as a result, Parliament eventually passed the
Statute of Monopolies in 1624 which limited the monarch’s power
to grant monopolies by allowing the monarch to grant monopolies
only for new inventions. 29
The debate over government-sanctioned patents did not end in
England. Thomas Jefferson, at the time of the framing of the

25. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–103 (West 2015).
26. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.).
27. Id.
28. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 15501800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 257–58 (2001).
29. Id.
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Constitution, sought to include an anti-monopoly provision within
the Constitution itself. 30 He and others viewed governmentsanctioned monopolies as tyrannical and feared they would stifle
competition. 31 Others, however, recognized that allowing inventors
the exclusive right to their inventions could serve as a means of
incentivizing innovation. 32 They understood that if inventors have a
protected right to exclusively profit from their inventions, those
inventors are more likely to risk the time and effort in attempting to
develop new technological innovation. This is especially true when,
like now, the development of a new technology often requires a
substantial investment in research and development. 33 This type of
investment may only be worthwhile if the inventor will have a
protected legal right to profit from his invention.
The founding fathers eventually came to a compromise, deciding
that a limited monopoly could be a beneficial way to encourage
technological advancement while balancing the needs of the public.
The Constitution does not contain a specific provision outlawing
harmful monopolies; instead it gives Congress authority “to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” 34 This provision not only creates a
constitutional basis for allowing monopolies, but it also provides
guidance on the scope and justification of that authority: Congress
may authorize such monopolies for limited times for the purpose of
promoting innovation. This balance between two objectives
constitutes a social contract between the inventor and society at
large. 35 The inventor receives a limited monopoly in the form of a

30. PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:5–6. See also Patents, THOMAS JEFFERSON
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/patents. This, of
course, was not a unique position to take at the time. Jefferson was probably influenced by his
contemporary—economist Adam Smith—who said: “Monopoly . . . is a great enemy to good
management.” ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
31. Patents, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. FTC, Chapter 3: Business Testimony: Current Innovation Landscape in Selected
Industries, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY
29
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited April 25, 2013).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1600 (2003) (providing a succinct explanation of what the authors call Propsect
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patent in exchange for bringing new technologies into the
marketplace.
Judicial interpretation of this constitutional provision and the
ensuring development of the American patent system reinforce the
notion that inventors may receive limited monopolies in order to
benefit society. Indeed, the Supreme Court has regularly recognized
that the purpose of patent law is to induce new development and
bring new products to market. 36 It is with this same principle in
mind that patents are filed with the patent office—making a
description of the technology a matter of public record. 37 An
inventor can have exclusive rights to develop, manufacture and sell
the invention during the life of the patent, but once the patent has
expired, the technology can be further diffused into the marketplace,
available to anyone interested in developing the technology for their
own purposes. 38
If Congress is not careful, however, this social contract may
become too one-sided. If the monopoly becomes too strong, then
the diffusion of technology may never occur. A patent holder may
decide not to grant permission for others to use or sell his invention,
and as a result, others will be unable to innovate further and expand
upon the invention. While in some circumstances the harmful effects
of this type of patent suppression may not be far-reaching, in other
circumstances, such as when a new technology has the potential to
address urgent issues, patent suppression may be more problematic. 39
For example, a patent is normally good for twenty years, 40 but in
some circumstances, the patent can be extended even beyond that. 41
Given the urgency of some environmental problems, it may
unreasonable to wait twenty years or longer to be able to ensure
market access to an important technology.

Theory, which outlines the give and take between a society and inventors as it is acted out
under patent policy).
36. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1966) (noting that “one of
the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning
discoveries and inventions”).
37. 1 WEST ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:13 (noting that “one of the purposes of
patent systems is to disclose inventions to the public”).
38. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:20 (2d ed.).
39. See infra Part I.B.2.
40. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:20 (2d ed.).
41. Id.

678

DO NOT DELETE

671

8/18/2015 10:37 AM

Addressing Market Failure in Intellectual Property Law

2. Abuse of patent law protections: patent suppression
Concern over patent suppression is not hypothetical. There have
been a number of documented cases in which this phenomenon has
taken place. In each case, patent suppression has been a means of
hindering the progress of new technologies. Inasmuch as patent law
is authorized under the Constitution in order to “promote the
progress science and the useful arts,” patent suppression—whereby
patent holders purposefully acquire patents only to prohibit their use
or development—is contrary to that purpose and represents a clear
abuse of that law. This section briefly explores a few examples of
patent suppression and explains how the current legal framework of
intellectual property and antitrust law is generally insufficient to stop
the abuse.
Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of patent
suppression was brought to the forefront of public attention by the
film Who Killed the Electric Car. 42 This documentary details the
development and eventual suppression of battery technology capable
of powering zero-emission automobiles. 43 According to the
documentary, General Motors acquired a small battery technology
company, Ovonics—which had made tremendous advances in
battery technology—and began to develop an electric car that would
eventually be named the EV-1. 44 When California’s political climate
and the looming threats of burdensome regulations made GM
nervous about the timing of the technology’s release, Texaco (which
was soon after acquired by Chevron) stepped in and purchased the
rights to the battery technology in order to suppress it. 45
Another example occurred in the light bulb industry in the
early 1900s. 46 General Electric, which had a large stake in the
incandescent light bulb industry, purchased the patent for a moreefficient fluorescent light bulb. 47 In order to maximize its profits
for the incandescent light bulbs, General Electric sat on the patent
42. WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR (Plinyminor 2006).
43. Id. Specifically, the car mentioned in the documentary is GM’s Chevy EV-1. Id.
According to the film, the car was completely battery powered and could drive distances up to
160 miles on a single charge.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling Resource
Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 512, 516 (1987).
47. Id.
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for the fluorescent lights, refusing to either bring the technology to
market itself or to license the technology to other market
participants. 48 Not until Sylvania, another electronics company,
successfully marketed a similar technology did General Electric
begin to use its patented florescent light bulb technology. 49
Bell Telephone also implemented patent suppression techniques
in order to preserve the status quo. 50 A 1920s investigation by the
federal government found that Bell Telephone had purchased and
suppressed over 3,000 patents. 51 Bell had developed a practice of
acquiring patents for the sole purpose of keeping those technologies
out of the hands of their competitors. 52
The law regarding patent suppression has not always been clear
and while it appears that antitrust remedies may be available as a
means of preventing some instances of patent suppression, such
remedies are still not generally available. 53 In 1886, a federal district
court held that a patent holder could only be guaranteed legal
protection of its patent if the holder was actually using the patented
technology. 54 However, in 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
patent non-use does not foreclose the patent holder’s right to
protection under the law. 55
With the birth of antitrust law, new remedies became available
to stop anticompetitive behavior through which powerful
companies tried to eliminate competition. 56 While it may appear
that patent suppression would fall into this category of behavior,
courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to apply antitrust
remedies to cases of patent suppression. 57 For example, in SCM v.
Xerox, the Supreme Court held that so long as a patent is acquired
legally, it is not a violation of antitrust law to use the patent to the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id.
Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 205 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886).
55. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908).
56. See generally, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006) (originally passed in
1890); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–17 (2006) (originally passed in 1914), and the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006) (originally passed in 1914).
57. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d. Cir. 1981.
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“full extent allowed under patent law,” which includes preventing
third parties from using a technology, even when the patent holder
itself is not using the patented technology. 58 The holding of this
case has been followed in subsequent decisions and is still good
law. 59 Thus, despite the similarities between patent suppression and
those problems generally meant to be addressed by antitrust laws, it
seems that antitrust law by itself is insufficient to stop patent
suppression.
3. A solution to patent suppression: compulsory licensing
One remaining way to avoid technology suppression is through
compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing eliminates the
possibility of patent suppression by requiring a patent holder, under
certain circumstances, to license its technology to others for
“reasonable” compensation. Compulsory licensing is not a new
idea. While it is not commonly relied upon as a means of ensuring
the diffusion of new technologies, compulsory licensing is already
an important part of American law. Compulsory licensing laws exist
by statute in some circumstances to be described below.
Additionally, courts occasionally create a de facto compulsory
licensing situation by refusing to enjoin patent infringers. This
existing compulsory licensing framework, while helpful, is severely
limited in its ability to address the full scale of patent suppression.
The Clean Air Act, Atomic Energy Act, and the Plant Variety
Protection Act all include compulsory licensing provisions that are
applied narrowly to specific types of technologies. 60 The Clean Air
Act, for example, requires that when a technology is necessary in
order to comply with certain federally established emissions
standards and is the only such technology available, it must be
licensed for a reasonable price to others seeking to comply with the
emissions standards. 61 The Atomic Energy Act gives the Atomic
Energy Commission the authority to designate certain atomic energy
technologies as being within the public interest, and thus subjects

58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Digital Sun v. The Toro Co., 2011 WL 1044502 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22,
2011).
60. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183
(2012); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012).
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them to compulsory licensing to either the Commission itself or to
those authorized by the Commission. 62 This authority has been
construed by the courts fairly narrowly and does not include, for
example, patents for safety-related inventions such as anti-radiation
chemical compounds. 63 The Plant Variety Protection Act gives the
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate certain patented
plant varieties as open to the public in exchange for “reasonable
remuneration” in the event of a shortage of fiber, food, or feed. 64
In addition to these very specific compulsory licensing
provisions, the United States government has additional rights in
regards to third party patents under Section 1498 of Title 28. The
statute dictates that whenever a patented technology is
“manufactured by or for the United States,” without a license, the
patent holder may sue the United States government for “reasonable
compensation” but may not be granted an injunction. 65 Though
limited in its application to use by the federal government, in
practice this statute constitutes the equivalent of a compulsory
license. When a patent holder’s only remedy is to receive
compensation for the use of his patent, the outcome is practically
identical to that of a compulsory license situation.
In addition to these statutory provisions for compulsory
licensing, courts can sometimes create a de facto compulsory
licensing regime for others by refusing to enjoin patent infringers.
While courts will ordinarily give injunctive relief against patent
infringers, this is not always the case. 66 The patent code says that
courts may grant injunctive relief in cases of patent infringement. 67
Sometimes, in the public interest, courts determine that it is better
to allow the infringer to continue use of the patented technology
while paying damages. 68 For example, in City of Milwaukee v.
Activated Sludge, the City of Milwaukee was using patented
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012).
63. Piper v. Atomic Energy Com’n, 502 F.2d 1393, 1399–1401 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
64. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
66. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934)
(noting that while ordinarily courts provide injunctive relief against patent infringers, but still
holding that an injunction against a water treatment plant would be against the public
interest); but see Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (indicating that the
standard for obtaining an injunction may be becoming more difficult).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
68. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d at 593.
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technology in one of its waste treatment plants, but didn’t have a
valid license from the patent holder. The court refused to enjoin the
city from using the patent and instead required the city pay damages
to the patent holder. 69 In so doing, the court created a compulsory
license in fact; the city was permitted to continue use of the
technology while paying monetary damages, just as a licensee would
pay a licensing fee for licensed technology.
Each of these examples of compulsory licensing within U.S. law
has potential to prevent patent suppression, but their limitations in
scope and applicability prevent them from solving the problem in a
substantive way. Under the Clean Air Act, the Atomic Energy Act,
and the Plant Variety Protection Act, compulsory licensing
provisions apply only to a very small subset of technology and only in
very specific circumstances. As a result, technologies outside of those
specific industries can still be suppressed. Similarly, compulsory
licensing to the United States government, while it can occur with a
broader set of technology, does not allow suppressed technology to
reach the national marketplace where it can be diffused and
innovated upon, because only the government or its agents are
authorized to manufacture otherwise suppressed technologies. Right
now, a patented technology can be ensured entry into the
marketplace only when a court creates a de facto compulsory license.
Even this form of compulsory licensing is limited in effectiveness
because the suppressed technology is still only legally available to the
firm or individual who first sued for infringing on the patent. To
really address problems associated with patent suppression, it is
necessary to create a compulsory licensing regime that reaches a
wider variety of technologies and guarantees access to a larger
segment of the market.
II. EXPANDING COMPULSORY LICENSING LAWS TO INCLUDE MORE
GREEN TECHNOLOGIES
Broadening the application of compulsory licensing laws can help
to reduce the suppression of important technologies; it is impossible
to completely suppress a technology when the law requires that the
holder license it to others. While there are some risks associated with

69. Id.
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expanding compulsory licensing, 70 there are tremendous benefits as
well. As discussed previously, the constitutional justification for the
protection of a patent is to promote scientific and technological
progress. 71 Given the pressing nature of many of our environmental
problems, progress in this area of science and technology is especially
important. Expanding the application of compulsory licensing to
include more green technologies will promote scientific and
technological progress in solving environmental problems.
Specifically, compulsory licensing can promote such progress by: 1)
ensuring prompt access to important technologies, 2) increasing the
likelihood of future innovation, and 3) decreasing judicial
inefficiencies.
A. Ensuring Prompt Access to Environmentally Important Technologies
The most obvious advantage of a compulsory licensing policy is
that it ensures that technological advances cannot be suppressed.
There is no progress when a patent holder obtains a patent and
refuses to use the patented technology. In these instances, progress
can be slowed by twenty years or more, as current patent laws give a
filed patent a life of twenty years, and that timeline may also be
extended for various reasons. 72 Given the inherent urgency of solving
certain environmental problems (such as climate change), a
prolonged suppression of important technology could be
detrimental. Any social costs associated with the expansion of
compulsory licensing may be worthwhile if society can make swift
progress
in
addressing
environmental
concerns—ending
environmental tragedies decades earlier than otherwise possible.

70. The fundamental concerns over compulsory licensing are addressed in Part III.
There are a number of those who claim that a compulsory licensing regime lowers the value of
affected patents. See, e.g., Neel Maitra, Access to Environmentally Sound Technology in the
Developing World: A Proposed Alternative to Compulsory Licensing, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
407, 419–427 (2010); Jeffry C. Gerber & Peter W. Kitson, Compulsory Licensing of Patents
Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 650, 676–77 (1972). While this may be
true, it is important to keep in mind that compulsory licensing does not completely eliminate
the incentive to innovate. Compulsory licensing under each of the circumstances contemplated
in U.S. law, still allows the patent holder to receive payment for the use of its patent.
70. Contents and term of patent; provisional rights, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). See also, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.).
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B. Encouraging Further Innovation

Furthermore, even if compulsory licensing decreases the
incentive for individuals to innovate, it may still increase the overall
level of innovation within the marketplace. It has been suggested
that when inventors sell the patents of their inventions to those who
can put all their resources into further development of the
technology, the ensuing specialization makes for a more efficient
marketplace: inventors reinvest their profits into future inventions
and developers are able to invest their resources to manufacturing or
marketing or whatever their specialty may be. 73 This type of
specialization leads to a more efficient use of resources which in turn
leads to greater innovation.
Additionally, as new and important technologies are released into
the market, those who would have otherwise been without access to
the technology can use and innovate upon them. Innovation may be
spurred just by ensuring access to new technologies.
C. Increasing Judicial Efficiency
Finally, a broader compulsory licensing policy could help to
decrease judicial inefficiencies. As has been discussed previously,
except under the very narrow statutory compulsory licensing
provisions in the Clean Air Act, Atomic Energy Act, and Plant
Variety Protection Act, the best way for anyone other than the
government to access a suppressed technology is to infringe on a
patent and ask the court not to grant an injunction prohibiting use
of the patented technology. 74 A judgment requiring payment of
damages but expressly denying the right to an injunction may be the
closest that a company can come to establishing a legally defensible
right to an otherwise suppressed technology. Requiring a potential
technology user to go through the litigation process in order to
ensure access to the technology is judicially inefficient. A compulsory
licensing policy will incentivize patent holders to come to the
bargaining table. If a patent holder knows that the law requires him
or her to license the patent, he or she will be less likely to refuse a

73. William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate
Inventors to Sell Patents. 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1123–28 (2004); KENNETH PORT ET AL,
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2d ed. 2005).
74. See supra Part I.B.3.
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reasonable offer to license the technology and will be more likely to
strike a deal, thereby reducing the need for litigation.
When patent holders and potential licensees are encouraged to
reach deals on their own, there is less need for the courts to be
involved. As a result, court dockets, which are already overloaded in
many circumstances, can focus on other issues. More importantly for
the purposes of this discussion, this also means that technologies can
be made available to the market more quickly. Instead of relying on
the expensive and time-consuming litigation process, patent holders
and licensees will come to an agreement on their own terms. This
also reduces the frequency with which courts will be forced to
estimate the just compensation for use of the patented technology—
a task that courts are often ill-prepared to undertake.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN OVER COMPULSORY
LICENSING: KILLING THE GOLDEN GOOSE
There is an important concern pervading the relevant literature
regarding the possibility of expanded compulsory licensing: forcing
innovators to license their technology will reduce the value of the
patent and, as a result, decrease the incentive to innovate. 75 When an
inventor invents something, she may very likely want to sell the
rights for her invention to the highest bidder. Under the current
system, the highest bidder may be a company whose only interest in
the patent is in suppressing it as a means of eliminating potential
competition. 76 If that company is no longer able to suppress the
patent, then its willingness to pay for the patent may be decreased or
eliminated altogether. As a result, the value of the patent to the
inventor is likewise decreased. Because the value of the patent serves
as a primary incentive to innovate, the reduction in value of the
patent could lessen the incentive to innovate.
This paper has already discussed how the development of new
“green” technologies represents an important means of solving
environmental problems. 77 If green technology is compared to the
mythical golden egg, then the system that fosters development of

75. Maitra, supra note 70, at 419–27 (2010); Gerber & Kitson, supra note 70, at 676–
77.
76. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2 (discussion of General Electric, Bell Telephones, and
Texaco).
77. See supra Part I.A.
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green technology is the golden goose. 78 If we eliminate the
likelihood of further innovation by trying to ensure access to current
beneficial technologies, we are saving a golden egg but killing the
golden goose. By carefully assessing the possibility of eroding
incentive and creating a policy that addresses those possibilities, we
will be more likely to develop a compulsory licensing regime that
avoids unnecessary negative repercussions on innovation while
simultaneously promoting progress in the development of
environmental technology. While there is reason to believe that this
fundamental concern over compulsory licensing is often overstated,
any concerns can be largely assuaged by a careful consideration of
both the price and scope of compulsory licenses.
A. Overstated Concern?
The concern that compulsory licensing could reduce the
likeliness of innovation makes sense in theory; the monetary value
of a patent serves as a primary incentive for inventors to create new
patentable technology. Even still, there may be sufficient benefits
stemming from the development of new innovation that companies
will continue to invest in research and development. One study
conducted by Frederic M. Scherer suggests that this might be the
case. 79 Scherer surveyed a number of multinational companies to
learn what effects mandatory licensing requirements had had on
their incentive to innovate. 80 Specifically, he considered the level of
funding companies contributed to research and development, and
found that compulsory licensing provisions had little to no effect
on the level of funding provided to research and development. 81
While Scherer’s study alone cannot conclusively indicate that the
concerns over compulsory licensing are completely unfounded, it
does indicate that the concern may be overstated. Scherer’s study
suggests that even in the presence of compulsory licensing laws, a
significant number of companies still have sufficient incentive to
warrant substantial investment in innovation. Still, policy makers
78. Cf. JACK AND THE BEANSTALK. For those unfamiliar with the story: in this fairy tale,
Jack climbs the beanstalk to reach a mythical land in the clouds. One of the treasures he finds is
a golden goose which lays golden eggs.
79. Frederic M. Scherer, Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States,
7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 171–72 (2009).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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should be careful about needlessly eroding incentives for innovation.
By carefully looking at the price and scope of mandatory license
agreements, policy makers can further ease the concerns over an
expanded compulsory licensing regime.
B. Getting the Price Right
Getting the price right is important. To avoid drastically
undervaluing a patent, and thereby undermining the incentive to
innovate, any license resulting from a compulsory licensing regime
should be compensated as close to its fair market value as possible.
Even from the basic assumption that the fair market value is the price
at which a typical patent holder would license a patent to a typical
licensee, 82 determining the correct price for a patent license is an
extremely difficult task. 83 There are a variety of methods that can be
used to approximate the value of a technology license, though the
most accurate methods can be remarkably complex. 84 To accurately
pinpoint the fair market value might require a team of economists,
mathematicians and statisticians a considerable amount of time.
While this type of analysis is by no means unhelpful, it is outside the
scope of this paper. Any economic analysis conducted by such
experts may be helpful in adjusting the way courts determine the fair
market value of a patent license, but this section will discuss the ways
in which a well-drafted policy may circumvent the immediate need
for such complex analysis: by encouraging both the patent holder
and the potential licensee to come to the bargaining table where they
can come to a licensing agreement that is beneficial to both parties.
Like the colossal bear walking the tightrope in a circus act, the ideal
policy will be strong enough to ensure that important patents are not
suppressed, but nimble enough to avoid disrupting the fair market
price of the patent. A strong policy will ensure that patent holders

82. Of course, the fair market value is often assumed to be “the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” 26
C.F.R. § 1.170A–1 (2008). However, under the circumstances addressed in this paper, we are
worried that some sellers may be unwilling to sell at virtually any price. Therefore, it makes
more sense to look at the price at which a typical seller would sell to a typical buyer—
eliminating the market disruption that occurs from a blatant refusal to sell.
83. KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 181–207 (2d ed. 2005).
84. Id.
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come to the table. A nimble policy will ensure that it is applicable to
a wide variety of technologies by avoiding they type of across-theboard requirements in price methodologies that may be helpful in
one industry but quite inappropriate in another.
One way that existing compulsory licensing policies have ensured
that their application is sufficiently nimble is to require that any
licensing fee be “reasonable.” A reasonableness standard leaves
plenty of room for the patent holder and the potential licensee to
come to terms that are beneficial to both sides. The problem
inherent in such a vague term, however, is that the two parties are
likely to disagree on what a “reasonable” fee should be. The purpose
of this policy is not to ensure guaranteed, low-cost access to
important technologies for anyone who needs it. While this type of
argument is frequently attached to the discussion of international
compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical technologies, where the
primary concern is whether citizens of developing world countries
have access to life-saving drugs, 85 this is not the primary concern
here. This paper is primarily concerned with the ability of patent
holders to completely suppress important technologies such that they
become completely unavailable to the market and bring
technological innovation to a stand-still. With this in mind, policy
makers should be more willing to allow the license price to be higher
than the typical market price, so long as the price is not egregiously
higher. A reasonableness standard accommodates this goal by
allowing the patent holder to maintain as much value in his patent as
possible.
One way that a compulsory licensing statute can help preserve
the value of a patent is by putting the burden of proof for
“reasonableness” on the potential licensee. Such a policy could
require a potential licensee wishing to license rights to a patented
technology, to make a reasonable offer to the patent holder. The
patent holder could choose either to accept the offer or provide a
reasonable counteroffer. At this point, the patent holder has been
forced to the table, but has the ability to put forth an offer that it
thinks would allow it to benefit from its patent. If the potential
licensee is dissatisfied with the counteroffer, she will have to
demonstrate to the court that the counter offer is unreasonable. At

85. See, e.g., Peter Maybarduk & Sarah Rimmington, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to
Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 325 (2009).
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this stage in the process, the various methods of intellectual property
valuation could be helpful, but so long as the patent holder can
point to some identifiable and well-accepted valuation method used
in determining its counteroffer, there will be a presumption that the
asking price is reasonable.
This type of “reasonable” standard already exists in current
compulsory licensing statutes. One example is the mandatory licensing
provision within the Clean Air Act, 86 which provision has never been
litigated. 87 Some have suggested that the lack of litigation of this
provision indicates that the statute is ineffective or unnecessary—
arguing that if nobody bothers to use it, it must not be effective. 88
While this point seems reasonable, the lack of litigation may also be
evidence that the provision is actually working to encourage parties to
come to a reasonable agreement on their own. The mere existence of
a compulsory licensing provision may be enough of an incentive to get
a patent holder to come to the table. Current experience with the
Clean Air Act suggests that this may be the case. Furthermore, if
patent holders are coming to the table, then suppressed technologies
are being made available to the market. If this is the primary goal, then
a compulsory licensing scheme with a “reasonable” pricing structure
can be the means of achieving that goal.
If a “reasonable” standard helps to ensure that the pricing policy
is nimble, a heavy damages provision can help to ensure that the
policy is strong. Under a compulsory licensing statute with a
“reasonable” licensing fee standard, especially when the burden of
proof is put on the potential licensee, there is potential concern that
that patent holder will hold out on negotiations in order to prolong
the negotiation process and incentivize the potential licensee to
accept an offer with an outrageously high licensing price. A heavy
damages provision against the patent holder in the event that the
court finds its offer unreasonable could help to reduce this risk. This
type of approach to environmental policy is not new. Current federal
environmental statutes regularly include high punitive damages

86. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012).
87. Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection,
4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 223 (1991) (noting specifically that “Section 308 [the mandatory
licensing provision] has never been invoked”).
88. See, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control
Technology, 57 VA. L. REV. 719 (1971).
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provisions. 89 A standard punitive damage is $37,500 per violation
per day, with the possibility of treble damages. 90 A similar approach
could be applied to a compulsory licensing statute wherein a patent
holder who refuses to provide a reasonable license counteroffer could
be faced with a significant fine for each day that passes before a
reasonable counteroffer is extended. A damages provision that holds
would-be patent suppressors liable for unreasonable counteroffers
could provide the necessary incentive to keep the patent holder from
making bad-faith licensing demands.
C. Scope: What Technologies Really Matter?
In addition to determining the right pricing structure for an ideal
compulsory licensing regime, it is also necessary to determine the
scope of any new policy. Given the problems associated with patent
suppression, it might seem that compulsory licensing provisions
should be imposed on all technologies. This is probably too extreme.
Sometimes guaranteeing access to a new technology is not
particularly beneficial, and may not be worth the added burden
associated with compulsory licensing. 91 Also, the language of the
Constitution suggests that the general rule should be toward
exclusive use for limited times. 92 Congress is given the authority to
grant to inventors “exclusive use.” While this is a power given to
89. See, e.g., Penalty Adjustment Table, 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2013) (showing that many of
the penalties associated with the Clean Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act can be up to $37,500 per violation per day).
90. Id.
91. For example, suppose a firm has just developed a technology that will revolutionize
the jelly bean industry—it has developed an artificial flavor that accurately represents the taste
of buttered popcorn and doesn’t invoke most customers’ gag reflex. Further suppose that this
particular concoction does not mix well with normal gelatin products and as a result cannot be
formed into a jelly bean with currently available technology. The firm thinks that a new gelatin
product, expected to be released next year, may hold the answer to their problems. Unsure of
how else to proceed, the firm puts the development of their new jelly bean on hold.
Meanwhile, a competing candy company gets word of the development in artificial buttered
popcorn flavoring and wants to force the inventing candy company to license its technology. A
compulsory license in this scenario would be harmful to the inventing company’s competitive
edge—one it had developed through a fairly substantial investment in research and
development—but would not achieve any substantive social benefit. Buttered popcorn flavored
jelly beans, while enjoyable for novelty’s sake, do not have much of an impact on our overall
quality of life. The costs of a compulsory licensing policy to a candy company—whose primary
business model is to come up with novel and sellable candy concepts—is high, while the overall
benefit to society is low. In this circumstance, compulsory licensing doesn’t seem justified.
92. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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Congress to use at its discretion, it still seems pretty clear that the
Founders anticipated that exclusive use would be the general rule. 93
Also, even with the pricing structure described above, there is still a
risk of adversely affecting the market price of patents and patent
licenses. While the urgency of environmental degradation may justify
this risk under some circumstances, limiting the scope of compulsory
licensing can help to avoid unnecessarily affecting these market prices
in less urgent situations. A compulsory licensing regime that is
limited only to environmentally important technologies can help
avoid unnecessary market interference.
1. Why environmental technologies matter
As has been discussed above, the idea of requiring compulsory
licensing of socially beneficial technologies is not new. The Atomic
Energy Act, Clean Air Act, and Plant Variety Protection Act all
contain compulsory licensing provisions intended to ensure access to
socially beneficial technologies. 94 Additionally, there is a tremendous
literature arguing for compulsory licensing of life-saving
pharmaceuticals to the developing world. 95 The most compelling
arguments for these types of policies emphasize their potential for
achieving social good. 96 In a balancing act between the social benefit
of increased access to important technology and the social cost of
decreased incentive for innovation, there may be no other technology
for which the choice to institute a compulsory licensing regime makes
more sense. Compared to other technologies, ensuring access to those
technologies which could help solve important environmental
problems is especially important for three primary reasons: 1)
environmental problems are increasingly urgent; 2) environmental
problems have a unique impact on human health; and 3)
environmental problems have long-term ramifications for multiple
generations.
With an ever-growing body of science relating to environmental
93. Id.
94. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012) (mandating access, under certain
conditions, to technology capable of reducing harmful emissions); Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2183 (2012) (mandating access to important energy technology); Plant Variety
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012) (mandating access to plant technology as a means of
preserving diversity).
95. See, e.g., Maybarduk & Rimmington, supra note 85, at 325.
96. Id.
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degradation and climate change, it is becoming more and more
apparent that current rates of environmental degradation are
becoming more urgent. 97 Sea levels are rising faster than original
estimates. 98 Over 600 million people live on lands that are ten
meters or less above sea level. 99 While sea levels rise, their waters are
also becoming more acidic. 100 Acidifying waters threaten the quality
and abundance of fisheries. 101 Decreased snowpack in the western
United States is likely to have drastic effects on the amount of
available water and is especially distressing given the region’s
already over-appropriated rivers. 102 Besides those environmental
concerns which are directly related to increased global
temperatures, other environmental problems present equally urgent
problems. Agricultural runoff contaminated with fertilizers has
created a “dead zone” that threatens fisheries in the Gulf Coast. 103
The growing natural gas industry and the process by which natural
gas is often extracted, hydraulic fracturing, is potentially
contaminating the groundwater supply for neighboring
communities. 104 Presently, each of these environmental problems
has the potential for an immediate impact on society. Any
technological advancement that could help to address these issues
could have immediate ramifications for those currently affected.

97. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [I.P.C.C.],
REGIONAL
IMPACTS
OF
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(1997),
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/regional/index.php?idp=03;
I.P.C.C.,
CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. See also Nathaniel Keohane,
The Urgency of U.S. Action on Climate Change, and the Prospects for Legislation, 18 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2010); Dan Galpern, Climate Change 101: Urgency and Response, 23 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 191, 222 (2008).
98. Keohane, supra note 97, at 2.
99. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change
and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17
(2007).
100. Keohane, supra note 97, at 1.
101. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 97, at 1.1.
102. COMM. ON W. WATER MGMT., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN
THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8, 14 (1992).
103. Nancy N. Rabalis et al., Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia, A.K.A. “The Dead Zone,” 33 ANN.
REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 235, 236 (2002).
104. Heather J. Avens et al., Analysis of BTEX Groundwater Concentrations from
Surface Spills Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 63:4 J. AIR & WASTE
MGMT. ASS’ N 424 (2013).
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Similarly, environmental issues can have a unique large-scale
impact on human health. Global warming has been associated with
increased levels of malaria, dengue fever, viral encephalitis, and
cholera. 105 Other studies have shown that poor air quality
contributes to a host of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. 106 A
vaccine, while an important technological advance, may inoculate the
individual who receives it against a harmful disease or virus, but
everyone breathes the air, relies on the earth’s soil for its food, and
drinks the water from the earth’s rivers. Significant technological
advancement capable of addressing these issues has the potential to
help improve human health throughout the world. When these types
of technologies become available, it will be ever important to ensure
that they are not suppressed.
Furthermore, many of the environmental problems of our day
have the potential to be irreversible. 107 As such, addressing these
problems as soon as possible may be critical to preserving our current
way of life. For example, the desertification of the Middle East and
sub-Saharan Africa may permanently alter the landscape—rendering
it unable to support those who live there. 108 Similarly, the overuse of
natural resources and resulting environmental degradation has
already led to the collapse of civilizations in the new world. 109 The
large-scale environmental changes that took place in these regions
have been extremely long-lasting and may not be reversible. If
history repeats itself and current practices lead to new environmental
degradation, the catastrophic effects could be far-reaching in both
space and time.

105. John M. Balbus et al., Climate Change and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 275(3) J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 217 (1996).
106. Marion Carey & Martine Dennekamp, Air Quality and Chronic Disease: Why
Action on Climate Change is Also Good for Health, 21:6 NEW SOUTH WALES PUB.
HEALTH BULL. 115, 117 (2010).
107. See, e.g., S.R. Carpenter et al., Management of Eutrophication for Lakes Subject to
Potentially Irreversible Change, 9:3 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATION 751 (1999).
108. M. B. K. Darkoh, The Nature, Causes and Consequences of Desertification in the
Drylands of Africa, 9 LAND DEGRADATION & DEV. 1 (1998).
109. THE COLLAPSE OF ANCIENT STATES AND CIVILIZATION 6 (Norman Yoffee &
George L. Cowgill eds. 1991) (noting that political collapse and environmental degradation
often accompanied each other).
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2. Which environmental technologies?
Understanding the importance of diffusing environmental
technologies is the first step, but determining which environmental
technologies should be included within the new compulsory
licensing regime is vital. If we define these technologies too broadly,
we risk the possibility of interfering with the market unnecessarily. If
we define these technologies too narrowly, we risk the continuation
of the same problem which exists today—namely that existing
compulsory licensing laws do not adequately protect against the
suppression of important environmentally-friendly technologies.
Finally, if we define them too loosely, we risk the need for excessive
litigation—if it is too unclear which technologies should be covered
under a new policy, courts will be forced to decide. While there are
no clear answers to these concerns, any new compulsory licensing
policy should include a clear framework on how to determine which
technologies should be included. This may be best accomplished by
a new or existing government agency. Administrative agencies, as
opposed to Congress, can provide both the requisite scientific
expertise and administrative flexibility that will be necessary for a
strong but nimble policy.
To avoid the need for undue litigation, the agency tasked with
determining the scope of technologies covered under the new policy
should provide a clear set of environmental goals and mandate the
licensing of only those technologies that can help to achieve those
goals. This kind of policy has the greatest potential to achieve what
current compulsory licensing law cannot: providing more stability for
everyone by creating a broad, but predictable set of technologies that
will be affected. The Environmental Protection Agency may be the
agency best-equipped for the task because it is already responsible for
assessing many of the nation’s environmental problems.
To avoid the need of undue market interference, the agency
should also only apply the compulsory licensing regime to those
technologies that are not already otherwise available in the market or
for which additional competition would be particularly helpful. 110 If

110. Reiko Aoki & John Small, Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential
Facilities Doctrine, 16:1 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 13 (2004). Addressing the factors that the
policy makers should consider when expanding compulsory licensing laws, Aoki and Small paid
particular attention to the importance of only mandating the licenses of technologies that are
otherwise unavailable. Other factors included the existence of other reasonable requirements
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a given technology is already readily available in the marketplace and
there is already sufficient competition, there is no need to interfere
by mandating licenses to additional market participants.
With these primary considerations in mind, the agency should
provide clear guidance for determining whether or not a technology
falls within the scope of the new policy. By establishing clear
guidelines and thus ensuring predictability within the system, patent
holders and licensees can develop clear expectations that will help
them as they negotiate the terms of their license agreements. To the
extent that litigation will ensue, the courts will also have clearer
guidelines than those which currently exist to help them determine
the scope of mandatory licensing agreements.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the environmental problems facing the world are
increasingly urgent and a new compulsory licensing scheme in the
United States could help solve many of these problems. While
technological innovation potentially holds the key to solving many of
these problems, those interested in perpetuating the status quo
currently have the ability to suppress helpful technologies by abusing
existing patent laws. This application of patent law is inconsistent
with the historical intent and Constitutional justification for patent
protection, but it is permissible under current law. Broadening the
scope of mandatory licensing could help alleviate the problems
associated with patent suppression, but comes with the risk of
reducing the incentive to innovate. Any modification of compulsory
licensing law should be wary of unnecessary risk, but in so doing,
may be able provide access to important technologies that can help
solve many of the problems associated with environmental
degradation.
Adam Gunderson
*

*

J.D., 2014. J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.

ensuring access to a technology and the ability of the patent owner to profit from his
invention.
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